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As a contribution to the debate, this position paper questions 
a number of fundamental assumptions: does the EU emis-
sions trading scheme contribute in any meaningful way to 
the Energiewende? Is it a targeted and cost-efficient tool for 
achieving absolute reductions in GHG? Does it help prevent 
out-of-control, anthropogenic climate change?
The failure of the conference of the parties to the United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
shows that a global climate treaty is still a long way away. The 
decision against fixed ceilings for GHG emissions per coun-
try and for a market-based incentive structure within the 
Kyoto Protocol was taken with relatively little warning and 
mainly as a consequence of pressure from the United States, 
Australia, Japan, as well as from large emerging economies. 
Most European countries as well as environmental NGOs 
were initially sceptical; whereas developing countries were 
explicitly opposed.3
However, after thorny negotiations emissions trading4 – 
among other instruments – was included in the Kyoto Pro-
tocol.5 Looking back, the insufficient reduction targets of the 
Kyoto Protocol have been diminished through the introduc-
tion of flexible mechanisms; in Germany, this has resulted 
in the elimination of the need for domestic emissions re-
ductions, despite the fact that Germany was one of the few 
states that decided to pursue its own enhanced targets. It 
should be recalled that emissions trading, since its introduc-
tion in 2005, has been viewed as a stopgap measure to be 
replaced by 2020 with other instruments. Today, this is all 
the more evident as such stopgaps have hardly achieved any 
The work of the commission of the German Parliament (Bun-
destag) on “Growth, Prosperity, Quality of Life – Paths toward 
a sustainable economy and social progress in the social mar-
ketplace” concluded in mid-April. One of the commission’s 
five project groups was titled “growth, resource consump-
tion, and technical progress – possibilities and limits of de-
coupling” and focused on socio-economic issues.1
In its final report the commission states that the European 
Union is a worldwide pioneer in achieving greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions reductions and that the EU has achieved 
their climate targets mainly through emissions trading. Emis-
sions trading is seen as a substantial factor in achieving the 
energy transformation (Energiewende) and in limiting global 
warming to a maximum of two degrees Celsius.
We categorically object to these claims.
In reality, during the first commitment period, which lasted 
from 2008 to 2012, only a small number of the Kyoto Parties 
have achieved a GHG reduction (on average the target stood 
at a 5.2 % reduction compared with emissions in 1990). Even 
Germany failed to reach the targets set by a cabinet deci-
sion in 1991. According to that decision, emissions in 2005 
were to be 25 % lower than in 1990 in the former West and 
reduced by a substantially higher amount in the former East.
The states that have achieved a reduction were either af-
fected by deindustrialisation, such as the United Kingdom, 
or by a collapse of the economic system, as with the former 
member states of the Council for Mutual Economic As-
sistance. As a rule, the proactive development of a climate 
policy did not play any role.
In public debate the typically modest reductions in GHG 
emissions have often been criticised; at the same time, pro-
posals have been made to preserve the EU emissions trading 
system. These proposals focus on reducing the oversupply 
in EU allowances in order to prevent a collapse in CO2 prices.
This is intended to send a price signal to instigate abate-
ment measures taken by those companies participating in 
emissions trading. Even though the EU emissions trading 
system (EU ETS) has no direct connection to post-Kyoto 
Protocol, the preservation of the system is seen as a precon-
dition for the successful conclusion of international climate 
change negotiations.2
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1 Three of the authors of this report document were members of project group 3. Their posi-
tion, which went contrary to the majority findings, was attached to the February 18, 2013 draft 
report as a minority opinion. See: http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/gremien/enquete/
wachstum/Kommissionsdrucksachen/91_PG3_Bericht_Kapitel_7.pdf. Special thanks to 
Jutta Kill and Timmo Krüger for their critical input. 2 See also Germanwatch: Der Gipfel von 
Doha: Aufbruch ohne Rückenwind. Analyse des UN-Klimagipfels 2012, p. 5; See generally: 
Altvater, Elmar/Brunnengräber, Achim (eds): After Cancún: Climate Governance or Climate 
Conflicts, Wiesbaden 2011. 3 Oberthür, Sebastian/Ott, Hermann E.: Das Kyoto-Protokoll. 
Internationale Klimapolitik für das 21. Jahrhundert, Opladen 2000, p. 244 ff. 4 Emissions 
trading between nations as laid out in the Kyoto Protocol must be distinguished from internal 
EU emissions trading between countries, which will be covered below. 5 According to 
Oberthür and Ott (2000, p. 248 and 128 ff.) this was apparently due to the fact that during the 
last break before the final voting took place, developing countries were focused on other 
agenda points and that overall the final compromises occurred in an environment of increas-
ing exhaustion among the delegates. See also: Grubb, Michael/Vrolijk, Christiaan/Brack, 
Duncan: The Kyoto Protocol. A Guide and Assessment, London 1999, p. 87 ff.
2results and the trend in overall emissions is heading in the 
wrong direction. At the end of the 1980s and in the 1990s, 
the German Parliament’s Commission on the “Protection 
of the Atmosphere” took a close look at whether emissions 
trading was an effective tool for protecting the environment. 
The commission opted unanimously for an energy tax in lieu 
of a trading scheme.6
eMiSSionS tradinG doeS not redUce 
GreenhoUSe GaS eMiSSionS
The principle of emissions trading consists of setting a 
price signal, and thereby identifying the most cost-effective 
means of meeting a GHG emissions reduction target that has 
been prescribed by law, while the total amount of emissions 
is gradually reduced through tradable allowances.
The system goes back to the Canadian economist John 
Dales,7 who inspired the US trading scheme with SO2 and 
NOX permits, as laid down in the Clean Air Act of 1995.8 In 
the framework of climate policy, emissions trading was ad-
vocated and tested by the energy giants BP (formerly British 
Petroleum) and Shell.9
Under the EU emissions trading scheme, the reduction 
target is the result of political negotiations (within the frame-
work of the annual conference of the parties, at the national 
level and that of the EU Council) and a forecast of future 
emissions of the industry segment covered by the scheme. If 
the forecasts for future emissions profiles prove too high or 
too low, there is little that can be done to correct the reduc-
tion target and adjust the available allowances. “The EU ETS 
is the world’s only commodity market in which the demand 
fluctuates while the supply is fixed years in advance.”10 This is 
one of the intrinsic weaknesses of the EU emissions trading 
scheme, and was responsible for the steep fall in the price of 
allowances that occurred in 2012.11 Although in 2012, emis-
sions in countries such as Germany and the UK were lower, 
current emissions figures indicate that not only are global 
emissions increasing12 but that the consumption of fossil fu-
els, and coal in particular, has increased “because of cheap 
coal imports, the prices of CO2 allowances, and the relatively 
high price of gas”.13
The GHG reduction achieved in industrialized countries 
thus cannot be attributed to emissions trading, but mainly to 
a shift in energy policy such as the Renewable Energy Law in 
Germany; the on-going economic crisis, and the offshoring 
of heavy industrial production to the Global South.14 Within 
this context, European emissions trading has not provided a 
viable model.
the trajectory oF eMiSSionS tradinG
A relatively high and stable price of CO2 allowances is central 
to determining the trajectory of emissions trading. Instead 
the price is in a free fall due to a number of factors includ-
ing weak economic output, weak production forecasts, and 
the energy and CO2 traders themselves. In 2012 the majority 
of emissions allowance trades did not consist of purchases 
and sales between companies covered by the scheme, but 
were made by investors and market speculators who traded 
for pure profit and not to achieve emissions reduction tar-
gets. The bigger the price fluctuations the bigger the profit – 
meanwhile companies emphasize the need for reliable price 
forecasts to enable long-term investments.
Emissions trading makes climate policy dependent on 
market trends and market power, neither of which is mo-
tivated by an interest in climate protection. Rather, market 
trends are the result of forces using climate protection as a 
means for making money without enhancing climate protec-
tion itself. It is grossly negligent, however, given the magni-
tude of the problem, to expect the CO2 market to facilitate 
a structural transformation of the energy economy through 
investments in a sustainable energy infrastructure aimed at 
moving away from the construction of new coal-fired power 
stations.
However, the oversupply of emission allowances and the 
possibility of purchasing additional credits from would-be 
emission reduction projects in developing countries (such as 
through the clean development mechanism) –all the more 
so since the criteria under the Kyoto Protocol regarding ad-
ditional mitigation often go unmet and face little oversight.
In fact, emissions have increased somewhat because of 
this mechanism.15 The oversupply and the free allocation of 
allowances (for utilities until 2012 and for industrial installa-
tions until 2020) have led to a steep decline in the price of 
CO2, which in turn has undermined incentives to decarbon-
ize the economy. At the same time, the imagined “costs” of 
the implementation of the EU ETS (which never materialized 
due to allowances being handed out for free) were passed on 
to consumers, for example, through the price of electricity.16 
In summary: emissions trading has not developed as hoped 
into a global trading system and has been further discredited 
by an abuse of international credits17 – which were neither 
backed nor verified by additional emission reductions – and 
by a number of auditing firms being suspended. The flawed 
construction of the European emissions trading scheme – 
evidenced above all by the “right to pollute”, the transfer 
of costs to consumers, and the crediting options provided 
through emission reduction projects in developing countries 
(so-called offset mechanisms) – shows that:
–  public funds are being wasted on a scheme that does not 
live up to its intended purpose;
–  an economic model based on fossil fuel consumption has 
been extended;
–  and emissions trading blocks effective climate policy.
Together with many NGOs we therefore conclude that eight 
years of persistent attempts by the European Union to build 
a functional and efficient emissions trading scheme have 
failed. The urgent need to drastically decrease GHG emis-
sions requires a focus on reliable alternatives to emissions 
6 Deutscher Bundestag. Bericht der Enquete-Kommission “Schutz der Erdatmosphäre”, 
Schutz der Erde, Bonn 1990. 7 Dales, John Harkness: Pollution, Property and Prices, To-
ronto 1968. 8 Environmental Protection Agency: Clean Air Act, Washington D.C. 1990.
9 Schafhausen, Franz: Der Emissionshandel, das unbekannte Wesen, Köln 2007. 10 Set-
aside necessary but not sufficient to save EU ETS – Deutsche Bank, 13.4.2012, see: http://
www.carbon-financeonline.com/index.cfm?section=lead&action=view&id=14434&linkr
ef=cnews. 11 Kill, Jutta/Ozinga, Saskia/Pavett, Steven/Wainwright, Richard: Trading car-
bon: How it works and why it is controversial, Brussels 2010. 12 World Energy Outlook 
2012 from the International Energy Agency. 13 Point Carbon: Plans to exploit fossil fuels 
to force emissions 20 per cent higher, 22.1.2013, see: http://www.pointcarbon.com/
news/1.2149042?&ref=searchlist. 14 Davis, Steven J./Caldeira, Ken: Consumption-based 
accounting of CO2 emissions, in: PNAS, 107(12), 2010, pp. 5687–5692. 15 Wara, Michael: 
A Realistic Policy on International Carbon Offsets, Program on Energy and Sustainable 
Development Working Paper 74, April 2008, Stanford University. 16 The world’s biggest 
steel manufacturer ArcelorMittal earned US$200 million in 2012 from the sale of CO2 allow-
ances despite the steep drop in prices (in 2011, the profit was US$ 93 million); see: http://
www.pointcarbon.com/news/1.2172009; see also: Point Carbon Advisory Board: EU ETS 
Phase II – The potential and scale of windfall profits in the power sector, March 2008: http://
wwf.panda.org/index.cfm?uNewsID=129881; see also: http://www.sandbag.org.uk/site_
media/pdfs/reports/Sandbag_2011-06_fatcats.pdf. 17 The most recent examples are the 
final verdicts against employees of Deutsche Bank. The VAT carousel fraud amounted to 
more than €5 billion in lost tax revenue. 
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trading.18 This means the solution to ecological problems 
cannot come from an application of the same logic that has 
both produced and prolongs them: in other words, problems 
that have arisen by placing a price or an economic premium 
expressed in monetary value on nature and by unleashing 
capitalist competition in an arena that must involve limitation 
and reduced growth. We doubt that the “financialization” of 
nature, and in this context emissions trading, can meet the 
challenges of socio-ecological transformation. The focus 
must be placed instead not on emissions trading but on strat-
egies for socio-ecological transformation and alternatives 
beyond the technocratic instruments of market logic.
alternativeS
After an initially promising phase of institutionalisation, to-
day global climate change negotiations are at a dead-end. 
The Kyoto process and emissions trading, in particular, have 
never had the impact they were designed to have. The United 
States never ratified the Kyoto Protocol; Canada withdrew 
from the treaty in 2011; and Russia, Canada, Japan, and New 
Zealand will not be participating in a second commitment 
period. Furthermore, big emerging economies have never 
taken part.
An important conclusion can be drawn from the failed in-
ternational negotiations and the experience with emissions 
trading: a new concentration on the input-side is needed – in 
particular with regards to coal, gas, and oil – as well as a fo-
cus on the whole cycle from sourcing, extraction, process-
ing, transactions (at exchanges), and transport to consump-
tion within logistical and industrial systems. “Extractivism” 
needs to be identified as what it is: an economic system 
adopted by much of the Global South in order to achieve a 
high return rate, to extract oil and gas in an “unconventional 
way” at high energy and chemical costs, and to serve the 
fossil fuel-based industrial production in the North and an ex-
ploitative, non-sustainable way of life,19 which stretches from 
personal transportation to factory farming, the main sources 
of GHG. The failure of international climate policy makes it 
clear that, despite their integration into a multi-layered politi-
cal system, the national sphere and national self-interests re-
main of central and strategic importance to the development 
of sustainable and unsustainable policies.
Alternatives refer to a comprehensive transformation 
of this way of life and production. Since abandoning nu-
clear energy, the following options have been discussed: a 
sustainability law that would ban the development of new 
coal-fired power stations; limit the lifetime of existing power 
stations and step-by-step eliminate coal-based energy sup-
plies.20 This would go hand in hand with a ban on fracking. 
These initiatives are backed by broad swathes of the popu-
lation, who are capable of being mobilized; similarly, these 
initiatives are also aspects of a civil society-based discourse 
on alternative growth models. In the past there have been 
“climate camps” at coal extraction sites and coal-fired power 
stations which served as starting points for direct action 
against the further expansion of environmentally destructive 
forms of energy production.21 Similar forms of local mobiliza-
tion occur against fracking projects or carbon capture and 
storage projects. Here, as well as with the protests against 
the deforestation of rainforests and new airport construction, 
it is not about an abstract reduction in greenhouse gases, but 
about the direct consequences of coal, oil, and gas extrac-
tion in people’s communities and open spaces, and about 
alternative forms of transport and ways of life.22 This is an in-
dispensable part of a new model of progress, if a “post-fossil 
fuel” economy and society is to be built.
Alternatives must involve new models of growth and la-
bour. It is a question of politics whether gains in productivity 
in industrialized countries are applied towards better quality 
of life (such as by ensuring less time at work) or more con-
sumption. A comparative study of the United States and 
Western Europe by the Washington Center for Economic 
and Policy Research shows that – despite problems of meas-
urement, and a substantial research gap – there is strong evi-
dence of a positive link between reduced working hours and 
lower levels of CO2-induced global warming. It is assumed 
that a yearly reduction in working hours by 0.5 % until the 
year 2100 would reduce global warming by between a quar-
ter and a half. We support these endeavours and advocate 
increasing their visibility as a means of increasing their viabil-
ity, even though more alternatives still need to be developed.
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Translation: Zachary Rose.
18 See for instance, the call to action: “Time to scrap the ETS” (http://scrap-the-euets.
makenoise.org; including a list of signatories). On the relationship between civil society and 
climate policy, see: Bedall, Philip/Brunnengräber, Achim: Internationale Klimapolitik in der 
Transformation. Die Zivilgesellschaft als Triebkraft?, in: Informationsbrief Weltwirtschaft & 
Entwicklung, Luxembourg, 4.11.2012: http://www.weltwirtschaft-und-entwicklung.
org. 19 Brand, Ulrich/Wissen, Markus: Sozial-ökologische Krise und imperiale Lebens-
weise. Zu Krise und Kontinuität kapitalistischer Naturverhältnisse, in: Demirović, Alex/Dück, 
Julia/Becker, Florian/Bader, Pauline (eds): VielfachKrise im finanzdominierten Kapitalismus, 
Hamburg 2011, pp. 78–93; Brand, Ulrich/Wissen, Markus: Crisis and continuity of capitalist 
society-nature relationships. The imperial mode of living and the limits to environmental 
governance, in: Review of International Political Economy, 2013 (forthcoming). 20 See 
Greenpeace: Kohleausstiegsgesetz. Verteilung der Reststrommengen und Folgenabschät-
zung für den Kohlekraftwerkspark, Hamburg 2012; Klaus, Sebastian/Beyer, Catharina/
Jaworski, Piotr: Allokationsmethoden der Reststrommengen nach dem Entwurf des Koh-
leausstiegsgesetzes, Nürnberg 2012; Bundestagsfraktion DIE LINKE, Kohleausstiegsgesetz 
nach Scheitern des EU-Emissionshandels, 16.1.2013, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/
btd/17/120/1712064.pdf Drs. 16/12064. 21 See: http://www.klimacamp.org. 22 See 
Bedall, Philip/Brunnengräber, Achim: Internationale Klimapolitik in der Transformation. Die 
Zivilgesellschaft als Triebkraft?, in: Informationsbrief Weltwirtschaft & Entwicklung, 
4.11.2012, http://www.weltwirtschaft-und-entwicklung.org.
4degrees Celsius. According to numerous scientists and the 
inhabitants of the areas hardest hit by climate change, there 
is a risk of uncontrollable climate consequences with an 
average increase in global temperatures of just 1.5 degrees 
Celsius. However, the goal of a maximum of a two degree in-
crease in global temperatures can only be achieved through 
a withdrawal from the industrial reliance on fossil fuels. 
This would entail a ban on new coal-fired power stations in 
the European Union, as constructing new power stations 
would cement the dependency on fossil fuels for decades 
to come. In addition, the signatories of the position paper 
call for measures that would impose an obligation on com-
panies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions at their point of 
origin. Enabling companies to buy themselves out of such 
obligations, as is the case with emissions trading (a means of 
paying others to supposedly reduce emissions somewhere 
else) can no longer be tolerated. The past eight years have 
proved that the EU emission trading is incapable of making 
a substantial contribution to the Energiewende. The call for 
ending the scheme comes with the understanding that coal 
and oil must be kept underground (“Keep the oil beneath the 
soil and the coal in the hole”). According to estimates from 
the International Energy Agency’s “World Energy Outlook” 
this would have to be done with 70 % of all known reserves 
if the two degree Celsius target is to remain within the realm 
of possibility.3 From the start, the EU ETS has hindered rather 
than enhanced the Energiewende. There are few indicators, 
if any, that the scheme has had any positive impact at all. On 
balance, eight years of the ETS regime has led to record prof-
its for the biggest environmental polluters and EU climate 
malefactors – profits that have escalated environmental pol-
lution and the generation of greenhouse gases instead of be-
ing used to take effective measures for climate protection 
or to finance the Energiewende, the end point of which can 
only be the total rejection of fossil fuels.4
2.  “Emissions trading is the only realistic way of limiting cli-
mate change.”
For eight years, the supporters of the EU ETS have repeated-
ly made the argument that the trade in pollution permits was 
the only means of implementing climate protection in the Eu-
Both critics and supporters agree that the European Union 
emissions trading scheme introduced in 2005 is not work-
ing. They differ, however, over the causes of the scheme’s 
failure and on options for reform of what is seen by many as 
the “pillar of EU climate policy”.
As demonstrated in the position paper “Time to scrap the 
ETS”,1 emissions trading remains far from being “the most 
effective climate protection instrument in Europe”. Rather, as 
the paper concludes, the ETS hinders active and effective cli-
mate protection and should be abolished. This position paper 
has to date been signed by over 250 organizations and stimu-
lated a lot of discussion on the topic. This shows that, on the 
one hand, there is wide support for the analysis regarding the 
scheme’s (non-reformable) structural shortcomings, on the 
other hand, to some extent, the same actors who are support-
ive of this analysis are also the ones advocating restructuring 
and reordering the EU ETS instead of dismantling it.
Below are our comments on the three main arguments.2
1.  “Demanding an end to EU emissions trading reinforces 
the position of the oil and coal industries, undermines ef-
fective climate protection and empowers lobbies working 
against the EU Commission initiative to postpone the auc-
tioning of 900 million EU allowances in order to reduce the 
surplus in allowances and to stop the steep fall in prices 
(‘backloading’).”
Among those trying to save the ETS are many large busi-
nesses, including the oil and energy giants Shell and Statoil, 
the Carbon Capture and Storage Association, E.ON, and 
Électricité de France. Finance sector brokers, certification 
and auditing firms, as well as validators and allowance trad-
ers also advocate intervention by the EU Commission to save 
the ETS. In one way or another, they all profit from the trade 
in fossil fuels, such as gas and coal, as well as from the trade 
in allowances, and in this way they have a direct interest in 
strengthening confidence in the collapsing market for emis-
sions allowances.
However, these actors have less interest in ensuring that 
the European Union adopts effective measures to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. Yet such measures are neces-
sary in order to mitigate the risk of out-of-control climate 
change and to pave the way for structural changes that will 
lead to the end of the industrial reliance on fossil fuels.
In contrast, the signatories to the position paper “Time to 
scrap the ETS” do not simply demand the abolishment of the 
ETS. Rather, they argue for a different approach to climate 
policy altogether in Europe, one that targets a real and fair 
restructuring of our energy infrastructure – the backbone of 
EU energy policy, production, and consumption – before cli-
mate change gets out of control and destroys the chance of 
implementing any such option.
The European Union has made a commitment to reduce 
the worldwide increase in temperature to an average of two 
jUtta Kill
active cliMate Protection 
MeanS aBoliShinG  
eU eMiSSionS tradinG
1 See: http://scrap-the-euets.makenoise.org/english. 2 For a detailed assessment of EU 
emissions trading see “Trading Carbon. How it works and why it is controversial” at http://
www.fern.org/tradingcarbon; “Performative Equations and Neoliberal Commodification” 
at http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/resources/results/taxonomy:14; “Green is the Colour 
of Money” at http://www.carbontradewatch.org/downloads/publications/EU-ETS_Report-
web.pdf; and Altvater, Elmar/Brunnengräber, Achim (ed), Ablasshandel gegen Klimawan-
del? Marktbasierte Instrumente in der globalen Klimapolitik und ihre Alternativen, Reader 
des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats von Attac, Hamburg 2008. 3 Carbon Tracker Initiative, 
Unburnable Carbon – Are the world’s financial markets carrying a carbon bubble?, March 
2012, at http://www.carbontracker.org/carbonbubble. 4 Bruyn, Sander de/Markowska, 
Agnieszka/Nelissen, Dagmar, Does the energy intensive industry obtain windfall profits 
through the EU ETS? Delft 2010, at http://www.ce.nl/publicatie/does_the_energy_inten-
sive_industry_obtain_windfall_profits_through_the_eu_ets/1038; Point Carbon Advisory 
Board: EU ETS Phase II – The potential and scale of windfall profits in the power sector, 
March 2008, at http://wwf.panda.org/index.cfm?uNewsID=129881.
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ropean framework and in the framework of UN negotiations. 
However, in reality the EU ETS has fed the illusion that it was 
possible to bring about a critical Energiewende through a 
market and pricing instrument which increases the costs 
of emitting climate-changing gases. Yet history has shown 
that it is hopeless to expect fundamental social change – that 
effect not only the structures of energy production and dis-
tribution but the entire economic model and its basis – to be 
brought about through market mechanisms alone.5
Nonetheless, policy- and opinion-makers in the European 
Union continue to treat emissions trading as a basic tool 
for shaping the Energiewende. Worse still, efficient policy 
instruments in the EU, such as feed-in tariffs for renewable 
energy, the regulation of large combustion plants, or energy 
efficiency codes, have been weakened or stalled based on 
the argument that they would threaten the price of emissions 
allowances.6 Thus emissions trading must be seen against 
the backdrop of a change in environmental and nature pro-
tection policy that has shifted away from direct state inter-
vention, and towards market-based instruments. Conse-
quently, the call to abolish the EU ETS is also a battle against 
the expansion of the market in allowances trading, which 
some divisions of the European Commission currently wish 
to expand to policy fields such as biodiversity and water.
3.  “Abolishing the EU ETS would constitute the failure of EU 
climate policy as a whole. This in turn would negatively 
impact on international climate negotiations that are cur-
rently at a stalemate. Hence, the end of the ETS would 
make further progress towards global climate protection 
even more difficult.”
The illusion that the EU ETS would provide a substantial con-
tribution to climate protection cannot be endlessly indulged. 
Arguably, an absolute failure in EU climate policy would ac-
tually consist in dogmatically holding on to a dysfunctional 
tool, in other words, emissions trading, despite the fact that 
prices are once again plummeting, and regardless of all at-
tempts at reform.
By contrast, in a situation where attempts to curb climate 
change through market mechanisms have evidently failed, 
immediately abolishing the ETS could encourage permanent 
withdrawal from fossil-fuel energy sources by boldly dem-
onstrating that we take climate protection seriously. There is 
no justification for continuing with what is unquestionably a 
failed “experiment”. To promote it and to finance its export 
to countries such as Vietnam or Mexico and to expand it to 
other areas of environmental policy such as forest protec-
tion, biodiversity, and water, in spite of the attendant risks 
and dangers involved, is, quite simply, malpractice.
Even supporters of the proposition to release 900 million 
emissions allowances later than scheduled, if not to an-
nul them altogether, agree that this measure will have no 
substantial impact on the pricing of emissions allowances. 
A growing number of actors from the financial sector – in-
cluding Deutsche Bank, Morgan Stanley, Crédit Agricole, 
and Barclays – charged with creating a liquid market for 
emissions allowances have in the meantime reduced or dis-
banded the teams they set up to do so. There is no reason 
to expect that withholding 900 million permits to pollute 
might secure a marketplace that is chaotic in every respect.7 
The proposal to postpone the auctions is no means of forc-
ing up the price of emissions allowances from the current 5 
euros to between 30 and 50 euros: the price that supporters 
of emissions trading consider necessary to effectively dis-
suade polluters from expanding their use of fossil fuel en-
ergy sources. It is worth noting again that there is not a single 
example from recent economic history of commodity prices 
triggering a fundamental market shift, let alone a real Ener-
giewende. This is currently particularly improbable, because 
the market is signalling that energy generation from coal is 
cheaper than investing in a meaningful Energiewende! Eight 
years of misfortune, malaise and melodrama in emissions 
trading are eight years lost on climate protection. It is high 
time to get rid of emissions trading!
Jutta Kill, a biologist, coordinated the climate campaign run by 
the environmental NGO FERN between 2000 to 2012. She has 
published numerous articles on emissions trading. 
Translation: Zachary Rose.
5 Lipow, Gar W., Solving the Climate Crisis through Social Change. Public Investment in 
Social Prosperity to Cool a Fevered Planet, Westport 2012; Food and Water Watch Europe: 
Pollution Trading – Cashing Out Our Clean Air and Water, Washington D.C. 2012, at http://
documents.foodandwaterwatch.org/doc/EUPollutionTrading.pdf. 6 Cf. http://www.guard-
ian.co.uk/environment/2007/aug/13/renewableenergy.energy. 7 Cf. “EU CO2 scheme a 
‘regulatory omnishambles’” (19 November 2012), at http://www.pointcarbon.com/
news/1.2066142.
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“Sell yoUr iSlandS,  
yoU BanKrUPt GreeKS”
20 popular fallacies concerning the debt crisis  
(also available in Greek and Finnish)
STEPHAN KAUFMANN
It’s that time again! Greece needs more loans and the govern-
ments in Europe are arguing about whether it’s really neces-
sary and who should foot the bill. There is widespread opinion 
in Germany that Greece itself is to blame for the problems it 
now finds itself in. Many believe, that Greece cheated its way 
into the euro-zone, then its government spent too much, and 
the governed worked too little. Latent nationalist patterns of 
interpretation of this kind have been nourished by German 
politicians and the media, who have no end of proposals on 
how to “solve” the crisis. For example, the Greeks should save 
more, work more and sell their public property – and if none 
of these measures help, then Greece will just have to leave the 
euro-zone or declare itself bankrupt. The stupid thing is, the 
arguments about the causes of the crisis are incorrect and the 
proposed ways out of the crisis will not achieve their goal.
http://www.rosalux.de/publication/37664
luxemburg argumente no. 1
iS the whole world GoinG BanKrUPt?
Government debt: What it is and how it functions.
STEPHAN KAUFMANN and INGO STüTZLE
The governments of the industrial countries have resolved 
to drastically save more money. This affects the poor in all 
countries, primarily in the form of social cuts. Why is this 
the case? Where does all this debt come from? Why do all 
states incur debt – even though it is generally considered to 
be something bad? And why not just cancel these debts, if 
the whole world is suffering under them? These are some 
of the questions that this brochure seeks to answer. It does 
not attempt to assert that government debt is actually not 
a problem. Rather, it attempts to demonstrate the purposes 
that government debt serves; when it becomes a problem, 
and for whom. Ultimately, questions of debt are questions of 
distribution: some people have to pay, while others benefit.
http://www.rosalux.de/publication/38962
luxemburg argumente no. 3
BeaUtiFUl Green world
On the myths of a green economy
ULRICH BRAND
The green economy will stop climate change and the extinc-
tion of species and in so doing will create high growth rates 
and millions of jobs. It’s seen as a miraculous weapon: it 
could stabilise global capitalism. And then capitalism would 
also become sustainable as well. But what is the green 
economy? Green economic policy parameters are sup-
posed to ensure a flow of capital that makes markets and the 
economy “greener” and that ensures the creation of “green” 
jobs. Enterprises are to pay an “appropriate” price for envi-
ronmental damage. And not least: the state is supposed to 
orient its public procurements to sustainability criteria and 
create sustainable infrastructures.
www.rosalux.de/publication/38457
Analysen
jUSt MoBility
Post-fossil conversion and free public transport
MICHAEL BRIE and MARIO CANDEIAS
Crises create opportunities to set long-range goals for the 
future. A key question is that of urban mobility in a world in 
which the great majority of the world’s population will soon 
live in cities of over a million inhabitants, many of them in 
metropolitan conurbations. Broadly speaking, there are two 
alternatives: one, the US system, of mobility that is centred 
on private, petrol-driven cars, can be ecologically modern-
ized and expanded to embrace the globe by switching to 
electric-powered cars; or, two, public transport can be ecolo-
gized and made more flexible. For historical reasons, the fac-
tors determining which of these alternatives will be chosen 
are very different and path-dependent. Whereas rapid transit 
systems have largely disappeared from many US metropo-
lises, European metropolises are characterized by mixed sys-
tems. In many metropolises in the southern hemisphere the 
car-based mobility of the rising middle classes coexists with 
the exclusion from urban mobility of large sections of the 
city-dwelling poor. Long-term experiments with a free-of-
charge public transport system could act as a global model.
http://www.rosalux.de/publication/38554
Manuskripte Neue Folge 2
the radical leFt in eUroPe
“Revolution and coalitions” –  
left-wing parties in Europe
BIRGIT DAIBER, CORNELIA HILDEBRANDT,  
ANNA STRIETHORST (eds)
Some 60 organisations can be considered part of the “fam-
ily” of left-wing political parties in Europe. This anthology 
includes 23 country reports reflecting development, politi-
cal concepts and self-understandings, organisational struc-
tures, strategies and programmes. Under what conditions 
do radical left-wing parties compete successfully in the 
political spectrum? Do they address the building of counter-
hegemonic societal alliances – or do they stay within their 
own “camps”? What are the answers to the existential issues 
of European development? And where can we find progres-
sive transformational projects?
http://www.rosalux.de/publication/38610
